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ABSTRACT
Financial crises are widely argued to be due to herd behavior. Yet recently developed models of herd
behavior have been subjected to two critiques which seem to make them inapplicable to ﬁnancial
crises. Herds disappear from these models if two of their unappealing assumptions are modiﬁed: if
their zero-one investment decisions are made continuous and if their investors are allowed to trade
assets with market-determined prices. However, both critiques are overturned–herds reappear in
these models–once another of their unappealing assumptions is modiﬁed: if, instead of moving in
ap r e s p e c i ﬁed order, investors can move whenever they choose.
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Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Capital ﬂows to emerging markets are notoriously volatile. Many researchers have
argued that a substantial fraction of this volatility is due to herd behavior. In discussing
ﬁnancial crises in developing countries, for example, Calvo and Mendoza [5] say that “ ‘the fall
f r o mg r a c e ’i nw o r l dc a p i t a lm a r k e t s...m a yb ed r i v e nb yh e r d i n gb e h a v i o rn o tn e c e s s a r i l y
linked to fundamentals.” Similar views can be found in other recent work, including that
of Chari and Kehoe [8], Cole and Kehoe [9], and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco [16]. More
generally, the belief that herd behavior is widespread in ﬁnancial markets is held by both
market participants and economists (Devenow and Welch [10, p. 603]).
Recently, models of herd behavior in which agents rationally mimic the behavior of
other agents have been developed (by, for example, Banerjee [3] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch [4]). In these models, herds occur because information becomes trapped; agents’
actions do not reveal their underlying signals. While these models, at ﬁrst glance, seem
appealing for understanding ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets, a closer look reveals a
problem: In order to generate herds, the models include two stark simplifying assumptions
which make applying the models to ﬁnancial crises diﬃcult.
The two stark assumptions are that investment decisions are discrete, zero-one deci-
sions and that there are no traded assets with market-determined prices. Researchers have
shown that if the assumptions are relaxed, then the models no longer generate herds. Lee [14]
shows that if investment decisions are continuous instead of discrete, then herds disappear
from the models. Avery and Zemsky [2] and Glosten and Milgrom [11] show that once the
models allow for trade in ﬁnancial markets, prices reveal information, and herds disappear.
With the more natural assumptions, these models do not generate herds because investors
can use the continuous variable, either investment or prices, to infer private signals; hence,
no information gets trapped. We label these critiques the continuous investment critique and
the price critique.
In modeling ﬁnancial crises it seems undesirable to abstract from continuous invest-
ment or prices. The scale of investments in ﬁnancial markets can often be easily changed so
that discrete investment assumptions seem unappealing. Moreover, prices are central to theoperation of ﬁnancial markets so that abstracting from prices seems particularly unappealing.
Taken together, the critiques suggest that the early models of herd behavior, at least as they
stand, are not applicable to ﬁnancial crises.
Yet, as we will show, both critiques can be overturned by replacing another stark
simplifying assumption of the early herd models with an assumption that is more natural
for applied situations. The stark assumption is that of exogenous timing, namely, that in-
vestors move in a prespeciﬁed order. We show that when this assumption is replaced by the
assumption of endogenous timing–when investors can move whenever they choose–the two
critiques are overturned; herds reappear in both the model with continuous investment and
the model with prices.
In our continuous investment model, investors must choose how to divide their assets
between a risky project and a safe one. The returns in the risky project are determined by
whether the economy’s underlying state is high or low. Information about that state arrives
slowly in the economy, in the form of a signal in each period. This signal is received privately
by one of the investors. Other investors attempt to infer this signal from observed levels of
investment. In each period, investors face a trade-oﬀ between investing and waiting to invest:
waiting is potentially beneﬁcial because it lets investors gain information, but it is costly
because of discounting. In this model, a small number of high signals leads all investors to
invest in the risky project while a small number of low signals leads all investors to not invest
in the risky project. The model generates herd-like behavior because, at some point, the
beneﬁts from waiting for more information are outweighed by the costs from waiting due to
discounting, and investors choose not to wait for future signals. The information contained in
future signals is never revealed to the market, and in this sense, information becomes trapped.
We call these outcomes herds because they satisfy two criteria: investors make the
same decisions regardless of their private signals, so that the outcomes are a cascade,a n d
the outcomes are ineﬃcient relative to those that emerge from solving a mechanism design
problem. The outcomes in our continuous investment model are ineﬃcient because of an
information externality that leads the private return to waiting to be lower than the social
2return. If uninformed investors would wait to receive signals before acting, the market would
receive more information in the future, and all uninformed investors would beneﬁt. Each un-
informed investor ignores this social beneﬁt to waiting when making decisions, thus rendering
equilibrium outcomes ineﬃcient. Our model with prices works similarly.
Thinking about policy toward ﬁnancial crises requires distinguishing between situa-
tions in which outcomes are eﬃcient and those in which they are ineﬃcient. Suppose a model
generated a cascade in which investors ﬂed a country, leading to a ﬁnancial crisis, but this
cascade was eﬃcient. While this outcome may be striking, there is no role for policy in trying
to prevent it. If, however, the cascade were ineﬃcient, and therefore a herd, there may be a
role for policy.
Our two models share the key feature with existing herd models that investors are
informationally large: the decisions of just a few investors can set oﬀ herds. This feature
is desirable in the context of capital ﬂo w st oe m e r g i n gm a r k e t sb e c a u s es u c hc a p i t a lﬂows
are dominated by a relatively small number of portfolio managers. While these ﬂows are
large from the perspective of the emerging markets, they are small from the perspective of
markets in developed countries. Not surprisingly, developed countries have a considerable
amount of specialization in acquiring information about emerging markets, so that investing
is dominated by a relatively few portfolio managers.
Our work here is related to an extensive literature on herds. Several studies are closely
related to ours. Caplin and Leahy [6], Chamley and Gale [7], and Gul and Lundholm [13]
allow for private signals and endogenous timing of decisions; however, none of that work is
directed toward the critiques of the early herd literature. See also the work by Vives [18] on
social learning.
Two studies have attempted to overturn the critiques of the herd literature. Lee [15]
shows that, with exogenous timing, ﬁxed costs of trading can lead informed investors to stop
trading after some point, so that information becomes trapped. If trading costs are small,
however, almost all of the information is revealed through prices. In international ﬁnancial
markets, the volume of trades is enormous, and ﬁxed costs of trading seem small. Avery and
3Zemsky [2] oﬀer a deﬁnition of herd behavior quite diﬀerent from that in the literature. They
show that with exogenous timing, herds in their sense can occur, but cascades cannot. We
follow the rest of the literature in requiring that for an outcome to be a herd, it must also be
a cascade. Hence, Avery and Zemsky’s model does not generate herds in our sense.
Finally, our work is also related to the large literature about prices revealing informa-
tion which has followed Grossman and Stiglitz [12] and to an extensive literature on bubbles
in asset prices (for example, Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite [1]).
1. Herds with Continuous Investment
We develop an economy with continuous investment along with endogenous timing
and slow arrival of information. We show that this economy has herds and that endogenous
timing is critical in generating herds of investment. We then describe Lee’s [14] continuous
investment critique of the early herd models in terms of our setup.
1.1. The Economy
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with periods denoted t =0 ,1,...with an inﬁnite
number of risk-neutral investors. Each investor starts with one unit invested in a safe project.
Investors must make a one-time decision to invest in a risky project. If they have not invested
in the risky project before period t, then in period t they can either wait until period t+1or
invest some amount xt ∈ [0,1] in the risky project and the rest in the safe project. Investors
discount the future at rate 1/(1 + r).
The returns on the risky project depend on the state of the economy y,w h i c hi se i t h e r
high, H,o rlow, L, but is initially unknown to investors. The present discounted value of
investing x units in the risky project is f(x) if the state is high and 0 if the state is low. (If
the state is high, we can think of the project as yielding a per period return of ˜ f(x), so that
f(x)=˜ f(x)/r is the perpetuity value of ˜ f(x).) The safe project yields a per period dividend
of r per unit invested in the safe project, so that the perpetuity value of one unit of the safe
project is one. This dividend is paid at the beginning of the period.1
4We assume that f is strictly concave, f0(0) is ﬁnite, and f(0) = 0. The assumption
that f0(0) is ﬁnite is natural in any applied situation with either a ﬁxed cost or a minimum
scale of production. If in any period t an investor decides to invest and assigns probability p
that the state is high, then this investor faces a standard static portfolio problem given by
V (p)=m a x
x∈[0,1]
pf(x)+( 1− x) (1)
where V (p) is the value of investing when the probability of a high state is p.L e tx(p) denote
the solution to this problem. Notice that V (p) ≥ 1 since it is feasible to set x =0and that
V (p) > 1 if and only if x(p) > 0. The ﬁrst-order condition at an interior point is f0(x)=1 /p.
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and 0 otherwise, so that p is the cutoﬀ level for investment.
Information arrives slowly in our economy. In each period t, the economy receives a
signal which can take on one of two possible values s ∈ {H,L}: that the state of the economy
is high or low. The signals are informative and symmetric in the sense that
Pr(s = H | y = H)=P r ( s = L | y = L)=q>1/2 (3)
as well as conditionally independent over time. Each period the signal is randomly distributed
to one and only one agent among the set of investors who have not already received a signal
and is privately observed by that agent.2
T h et i m i n gi ne a c hp e r i o di st h a tﬁrst an investor receives a signal and then invest-
ment decisions are made. The only publicly observable event in any period t is the aggregate
quantity of investment, denoted Xt. The public history ht =( X0,X 1,...,X t−1) records the
aggregate quantity of investment in each period up through the beginning of period t. In-
vestors also privately record the signal they receive, if any, and the period in which they
receive it. Thus, the history of an investor i in period t who has received a signal in r is
hit =( ht,s r,r), and the history of an investor who has not received a signal is simply the
public history.
5In each period t, given their histories, investors can be described as belonging to one of
four groups. Any investor who has already invested is inactive. T h ea c t i v ei n v e s t o r si np e r i o d
t consist of a newly informed investor who receives the signal at the beginning of period t,
previously informed investors who received a signal in some period r before t, and uninformed
investors who have not yet received a signal.
An investor’s strategy and beliefs are sequences of functions xt(hit) and pt(hit) that
map the investor’s histories into actions and into the probability that the state is high. Notice
that we have imposed symmetry by supposing that all investors who have the same histories
t a k et h es a m ea c t i o n sa n dh a v et h es a m eb e l i e f s .L e tpt(ht) be the public beliefs, that is, the
probability that the state is high, conditional on the public history ht.
The payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned as follows. The payoﬀ to an investor who makes an investment
decision in period t with history hit is
Vt(hit)=m a x
x∈[0,1]
pt(hit)f(x)+( 1− x). (4)
Note that Vt(hit) does not include current dividends from the safe project and, hence, is the
post-dividend payoﬀ to investing.




µt(hit+1|hit)max{Vt+1(hit+1),W t+1(hit+1)}]/(1 + r) (5)
where µt(hit+1|hit) is the conditional distribution over histories in t+1given the history in t.
Clearly, an investor invests in period t if Vt(hit) ≥ Wt(hit) and waits otherwise. Notice that
the conditional distribution µt(hit+1|hit) is induced from the strategies and the structure of
exogenous uncertainty of the game in the obvious way.
We refer to this game as the private signal game.A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
this game is a set of strategies xt(hit), a set of conditional distributions µt(hit+1|hit), and a
set of beliefs p(hit) such that (i) for every history hit, the investment and waiting decisions
are optimal and (ii) the conditional distributions µit(hit+1|hit) and the beliefs pt(hit) are
consistent with Bayes’ rule wherever possible and arbitrary otherwise.
6In the game, investors get information from two sources: they receive private signals,
and they see the investment decisions of others and try to infer their underlying signals. In
a region where uninformed investors can accurately infer the underlying signals of informed
investors, it is as if these uninformed investors see the signal (with a lag) and update their
beliefs using Bayes’ rule. For arbitrary beliefs p, we use Bayes’ rule to deﬁne PH(p) and PL(p)
as the updated beliefs that the state is high, given that signals H and L were either directly
received or indirectly inferred:
PH(p)=
pq




p(1 − q)+( 1− p)q
(7)
where q is deﬁn e di n( 3 ) .L e tp(0) = p0,p (1) = PH(p(0)),p (2) = PH(p(1)), and so on, and
let p(−1) = PL(p(0)),p (−2) = PL(p(−1)), and so on. Thus, p(k) for k>0 is the prior
probability that the state is high if k high signals have been received, and p(k) for k<0 is
the prior probability that the state is high if k low signals have been received. Notice from
the symmetry in (3) that
PH(PL(p)) = PL(PH(p)) = p (8)
so that the eﬀect on the prior of a given set of signals is summarized by the number of high
signals minus the number of low signals in the set. Thus, for example, receiving two high
signals and one low signal yields the same prior as receiving one high signal.
Now focus on the region of the parameter space that satisﬁes these two assumptions:
V(p(0)) > 1 (9)
V(p(−1)) =1 . (10)
To interpret these assumptions, recall that V (p) > 1 if and only if x(p) > 0. Assumption (9)
implies that if an investor is forced to invest at the initial prior, this investor will invest a
strictly positive amount in the risky project. Assumption (10) implies that if an investor is
forced to invest at beliefs p(−1), this investor will invest nothing in the risky project. These
7assumptions imply that the cutoﬀ level for investment p deﬁned in (2) is between p(0) and
p(−1). For an alternative interpretation, suppose f(x)=Ax, for some constant A,s ot h a tf
is linear. Then the assumptions reduce to p(0)A>1 and p(−1)A ≤ 1.
The key decision in the model is to invest in the current period or to wait. Waiting
is costly because of discounting, but waiting is valuable for two information-related reasons.
First, waiting to receive information is beneﬁcial because investors have the option of not
investing if the information makes investors suﬃciently pessimistic. We call this value the
no investment option value. Second, even if investors are suﬃciently optimistic that they
know they will eventually invest, information allows the investor to ﬁne tune the scale of
their investment. We call this value the ﬁne-tuning value.
In addition to (9) and (10), we make an assumption that ensures that the no investment
option value is large relative to discounting, and one that ensures that the ﬁne-tuning value
is small relative to discounting. To ensure that the no investment option value is large, we
assume that
V(p(0)) <[r + vH(p(0))V(p(1)) + vL(p(0))]/(1 + r) (11)
where vH(p)=pq +( 1− p)(1 − q) is the probability that a high signal is received when the
prior is p and vL(p)=p(1−q)+(1−p)q is the probability that a low signal is received when
the prior is p.
Assumption (11) essentially says that discounting is small relative to the value of
information if that information could lead the investor to invest nothing in the risky project.
T h el e f ts i d eo f( 1 1 )i st h ev a l u eo fi n v e s t i n ga tp(0). Now suppose that an uninformed investor
knows that waiting (rather than investing) will allow the investor to draw the following
inferences from the actions of informed investors: with probability vH(p(0)), a high signal
has occurred, so that the prior rises to p(1) and, with probability vL(p(0)), a low signal has
occurred, so that the prior falls to p(−1). The right side of (11) is the payoﬀ to the (possibly)
suboptimal strategy of investing if the prior rises to p(1) a n dn e v e ri n v e s t i n gi ft h ep r i o rf a l l s
to p(−1), where the payoﬀ to never investing is clearly 1. Then (11) says that the investor is
better oﬀ waiting to receive this type of information rather than investing immediately. In
8this sense, assumption (11) says that the value of the no investment option is large relative
to discounting. This assumption is satisﬁed if r is suﬃciently small.
To ensure that the ﬁne-tuning value is relatively small, we assume that
V(p) >[r + vH(p)V(PH(p)) + vL(p)V(PL(p))]/(1 + r) (12)
for all p ≥ p(1). This assumption requires that investing at a prior of, say, p dominates waiting
one period, indirectly inferring a signal, and then investing the optimal larger amount if the
inferred signal is high, so that the prior rises to PH(p), and the optimal smaller amount if
the inferred signal is low, and the prior falls to PL(p). Assumption (12) thus says that the
ﬁne-tuning value is small relative to discounting.
To understand the intuition for assumption (12), suppose that f(x) = Ax for x ≤ 1/2
and A/2 for x>1/2. Then, if (9) holds, (12) automatically holds, since the value of ﬁne-
tuning is zero: it is optimal to run the project at rate 1/2, regardless of whether the inferred
signal about the state in the next period turns out to be high or low. That is, the optimal
size of the project does not vary at all with marginal changes in information. To see this,
note that since p, PH(p),a n dPL(p) a r ea l lg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt op(0) in each of the
corresponding portfolio problems, it is optimal to set x =1 /2,s ot h a tV (p0)=p0A/2 for p0
equal to p, PH(p),o rPL(p). Since the prior p is the mean of the posterior distribution, it
follows that p = vH(p)PH(p)+vL(p)PL(p). With some manipulation, we can rewrite (12) as
pA > 1, which is implied by (9). More generally, when f is suﬃciently concave at x(p) for
p ≥ p(1), (12) is likely to be satisﬁed because the optimal size of the project varies little with
marginal changes in information.
We now informally describe investor strategies. The strategy of uninformed and previ-
ously informed investors is to invest x(p) i fa n do n l yi ft h ep r i o ri sa tl e a s tp(1).T h es t r a t e g y
of newly informed investors is to invest x(p) if and only if the prior p is at least p(0). From
these strategies, it is easy to construct how beliefs evolve.
These strategies lead to the following equilibrium outcomes. The newly informed
investor in period 0 invests if the signal is high and waits if the signal is low. All uninformed
investors wait.
9The decisions in period 1 depend on the history from period 0. If there was positive
investment in period 0, then the uninformed investors infer that the signal in period 0 was
high, their priors rise to p(1), and they all invest, while the newly informed investor in period
1 invests regardless of the signal. We say that this history starts a cascade of investment, in
that all investors invest, and future signals are never revealed to the market. If there was
zero investment in period 0, then the uninformed investors infer that the signal in period 0
was low, their priors fall to p(−1), and they wait. The newly informed investor in period 1
invests if the signal is high, but otherwise waits.
At the beginning of period 2, if there has been no investment in both periods 0 and
1, then uninformed investors’ priors fall to p(−2), and no investor invests in period 2 or any
subsequent period. We will say that this history starts a cascade of no investment, in that
no investors invest, and future signals are never revealed to the market. If there has been no
investment in period 0 but an investment in period 1, then both the uninformed investors
and the previously informed investor have a prior of p(0), they wait, and the newly informed
investor invests if and only if the signal is high.
Let X(k)=x(p(k)) denote the investment level associated with prior p(k). Then,
more generally, histories of the form (0,X(0),0,X(0),...,0,X(0),X(1)) start cascades of
investment while histories of the form(0,X(0),0,X(0),...,0,X(0),0,0) start cascades of no
investment.
In the appendix, we formally deﬁne the strategies and beliefs and prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (9)—(10) and (11)—(12), the strategies and beliefs
described above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Our model generates cascades because, as soon as the public beliefs reach p(1),t h e
beneﬁts from waiting for more information are outweighed by the costs from waiting due
to discounting, and investors choose to invest rather than to wait for future signals. Once
public beliefs reach p(−2), no newly informed investor invests, and all uninformed investors
10keep their assets in the safe project forever. Thus, in both cases, the information contained
in future signals is never revealed to the market, and in this sense, information becomes
trapped.
1.2. Herds
So far we have shown that our equilibrium generates cascades, that is, outcomes in
which information becomes trapped. This trapping of information need not be ineﬃcient. An
interesting feature of our model is that the equilibrium cascades are also ineﬃcient relative
to some benchmark. We refer to such ineﬃcient cascades as herds. We make the distinction
between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient cascades in order to facilitate future policy analysis of cascade-
like behavior.
Our benchmark captures some of the physical restrictions inherent in the environment.
In the private signal game, the uninformed agents can react to the revealed information only
with a one-period lag. Our benchmark public signal game which captures this lag is as
follows: uninformed agents learn the realization of the period t signal after they have made
their period t investment decisions.
We ﬁnd the public signal game a useful benchmark for eﬃciency because its outcomes
are the eﬃcient outcomes of a certain mechanism design problem in the private signal game.
In the mechanism design problem, privately informed investors can report their signals to the
mechanism designer in each period t, and the mechanism designer can communicate these
signals to other investors after period t investment decisions are made. Clearly, truth-telling is
an equilibrium of this mechanism, and the truth-telling outcomes correspond to the outcomes
of the public signal game.
In our public signal game, the signals are observed by all investors. In this game,
the public history at the beginning of period t is st−1 =( s0,s 1,...,s t−1),a n dt h e r ei sn o
need to record the history of investments. Let zUt(st−1) denote the investment decision in
period t of the uninformed and the previously informed investors with the signal history st−1.
The relevant history for the newly informed agent in period t is st, and the corresponding
investment decision is zIt(st). Let Zt(st) denote the aggregate investment in period t. Beliefs
11follow from Bayes’ rule. An equilibrium is deﬁned as before.
We can make our original private signal game parallel to this public signal game as
follows. In the private signal game, the uninformed investors’ strategies are deﬁned over
histories of investment while the informed investors’ strategies include their private signals
as well as histories of investment. Given any realization of a history of signals st, we can
use these strategies recursively to determine aggregate investment as a function of st. For
example, given the initial signal s0 in some history st, the strategies determine the amount
that the informed investor invests and the amount the uninformed investors invest in period
0 and, hence, determine the aggregate investment in period 0, written as X0(s0). Given this
investment and the signal in period 1, the strategies determine the resulting investment in
period 1, written as X1(s1). Continuing this process, we can recursively determine Xt(st),
which denotes the aggregate investment outcome of the original private signal game for a
history of signals st.
Definition. The private signal game has a herd at st if (i) for all future histories
sr containing st,X r(sr) does not vary with (st+1,...,s r) and (ii) for some future history sr
containing st,Z r(sr) 6= Xr(sr), so that the outcomes in the public and private signal games
do not coincide. Ah e r da tst is a herd of investment if Xr(sr) > 0 for all future histories sr
containing st. And a herd at st is a herd of no investment if Xr(sr)=0for all future histories
sr containing st.
The ﬁrst clause in this deﬁnition of a herd requires that aggregate investments are the
same regardless of the signals, or that the outcome is a cascade. The second clause requires
that aggregate investments are ineﬃcient relative to the public signal game, so that a herd
is an ineﬃcient cascade. Several researchers (including Banerjee [3]) have deﬁned notions of
herd behavior which require only the ﬁrst clause, our notion of a cascade. In common usage,
however, the term herd entails some form of mistaken behavior. The second clause of the
deﬁnition attempts to capture this usage by ensuring that if everyone is doing the same thing,
then relative to the public signal game, they are doing the wrong thing.
12We can show that the model has herds under the following assumption:
V(p(1)) < [r + vH(p(1))V(p(2)) + vL(p(1)) ¯ W(p(0))]/(1 + r) (13)
where ¯ W(p(0)) = [r + vH(p(0))V(p(1)) + vL(p(0))]/(1+r). Assumption (13) is a strength-
ened version of (11) since, given (10), it is easy to see that (13) implies (11). Assumption
(13) implies that in the public signal game, in any period t, investing at p(1) is dominated
by the following strategy: Wait until t +1 ;if the signal is high, invest, and if the signal is
low, wait until t +2and invest if and only if the signal is high. The following proposition is
immediate:
Proposition 2. (Herds with Continuous Investment) Under (9)—(10), (11)—(12), and
(13), the model with endogenous timing has herds of both investment and no investment.
1.3. The Continuous Investment Critique
Our model diﬀers in three key respects from the early models in the herd literature.
First, and most importantly, we have endogenous rather than exogenous timing of investment
decisions. Second, investments are continuous rather than discrete, zero-one decisions. Third,
information arrives slowly over time rather than arriving all at once at the beginning.
Our results overturn one critique of the early herd models, that their ability to generate
herds depends critically on the discreteness of the investment decisions, that is, on the action
space being coarse relative to the signal space (Lee [14]). In particular, Lee shows that if
investment decisions are continuous and the timing of investment decisions is exogenous, then
the early herd models cannot generate herds.
To understand this critique, consider a version of our benchmark model in which the
timing of investment decisions is exogenously speciﬁed. Speciﬁcally, suppose that in each
period t, only the newly informed investor can invest. We deﬁne both a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium and herds for this game in analogous ways to those in the game with endoge-
nous timing. The proof of the following proposition is a straightforward adaptation of the
arguments of Lee [14] and is available in the working paper version of our paper.
13Proposition 3. (The Continuous Investment Critique) Under assumptions (9) and
(10), the model with exogenous timing has no herds of investment.
The idea behind the proof is that as long as the prior is above the cutoﬀ level p, the
investor in period t invests some positive amount, say, xt, given by (2). From the investor’s
ﬁrst-order condition, the belief of the investor can be inferred to be pt =1 /f0(xt). The
investor’s signal can then be uncovered using the public belief pt−1.
The basic idea in the exogenous timing model is that investors are forced to wait for
their signals, and given the continuous nature of investment, investors’ actions reveal their
signals. Hence, information does not become trapped, and there can be no ineﬃcient cascades
of investment. In contrast, in the endogenous timing model, investors are not forced to wait
for their signals, and investors ﬁnd it privately optimal to invest before they receive their
private signals. Since investors do not internalize the beneﬁts to others of waiting to receive
signals and transmitting this information to the market, the outcomes are ineﬃcient.
The assumption that, in each period, only the newly informed investor can invest
can be interpreted in at least two ways. The interpretation in the literature on herds with
exogenous timing is that all investors receive signals at the beginning of the game, but each
investor is assigned a speciﬁc period in which to invest. An alternative interpretation is that
both investment opportunities and information arrive slowly and at the same time.
2. Herds with Prices
The other critique of the early herd models is that if investors can trade investment
projects in the models, then the prices of the projects reveal information, and herds disappear
from the models (as in Avery and Zemsky [2] and Glosten and Milgrom [11]). Here we show
that with endogenous timing as well as prices, herds reappear. We also discuss the signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between Avery and Zemsky’s [2] work and ours.
142.1. The Economy
We consider a variant of the continuous investment model in which investors trade
investment projects. Here we replace one continuous variable, investment, with another
continuous variable, prices, and show that the model can generate herds. We add an inﬁnite
number of risk-neutral market makers, who set prices in a competitive fashion, together with
some idiosyncratic traders. Otherwise, the basic setup is quite similar.
Including market makers is a convenient way of modeling competitive trade between
informed and uninformed investors. In our model, all trades occur between investors and
market makers. We could dispense with the market makers and have direct trades between
investors, but doing so would complicate the notation of the investors’ decision problems
without altering the results.
Introducing idiosyncratic traders guarantees that the equilibrium of our model has
trade. Moreover, in models without idiosyncratic traders, adverse selection leads market
makers to price assets at the extremes of the distribution of values: market makers will sell
a project only at its highest possible value and will buy a project only at its lowest possible
value. As the number of signals increases, so does the adverse selection problem, and trade
eventually disappears. While the adverse selection problem in our model with two signals
is not severe, having idiosyncratic traders ensures that our results immediately generalize to
models with many signals.
The signals about the underlying state arrive slowly to the economy, as in the contin-
uous investment model, and are drawn from a distribution given by (3). In addition to the
market makers, the model has an inﬁnite number of risk-neutral agents. A fraction 1 − α of
the agents are idiosyncratic traders, and the rest are (standard) investors.
Idiosyncratic traders are imagined to have some personal reason that makes them want
to buy or sell with probability 1/2 each, in any period, regardless of the price and any other
information. Since these agents trade for idiosyncratic reasons, we do not need to model their
investment decisions or payoﬀs.
Brieﬂy, the model works as follows. The market maker loses money to the informed
15investors, makes money with the idiosyncratic traders, and makes zero expected proﬁts on
trades. The zero expected proﬁt condition is supposed to capture the idea that market makers
are competitive.
Uninformed investors observe the trades in the market and infer some information
about the informed traders’ signals. This inference works as follows. In the relevant region
of the equilibrium, when an investor sells a project to the market maker, the uninformed
investor infers that the seller was either an informed investor with a low signal or an idio-
syncratic trader. Likewise, when an investor buys a project from the market maker, the
uninformed investor infers that the buyer was either an informed investor with a high signal
or an idiosyncratic trader. The uninformed investors then update their beliefs according to
Bayes’ rule. The prices the market maker charges for buying and selling reﬂect the same set
of inferences.
The uninformed investors face the same tension as in the continuous investment model,
between investing immediately and waiting for more information, which is costly because of
discounting. At some point, the gains from more information are outweighed by the costs
of discounting, and the uninformed investors invest. Since these investors ignore any social
beneﬁts their actions may have in providing more information to the market, their actions are
privately optimal but socially suboptimal. Thus, the model can generate ineﬃcient cascades
that we call herds.
More speciﬁcally, the rest of the model is as follows. Each investor is endowed with
a risky project. Each project requires an investment of one unit of eﬀort to become viable.
Here the cost of eﬀort generates an opportunity cost to investing in the risky project similar
to that of the safe project in the continuous investment model. This investment pays oﬀ A
units if the state is high and zero if the state is low. Thus, if an investor has beliefs p that
the state is high and already owns a project, then the payoﬀ from investing, net of the eﬀort
cost, is pA − 1.
In terms of market trades, the investors have three options: sell the project to a market
maker, buy a second project from the market maker, or not trade. In terms of investments,
16we assume that if an investor buys a second project, then the investor must invest in both.
This assumption is innocuous since in equilibrium an investor who wants to buy will always
also want to invest as much as possible. The choices of investors in any period are, then,
four: to sell a project, to buy a second project and invest in both, to invest in their own
project without trading, or to do nothing and wait. We denote these choices by S,B,I,N,
respectively.
These choices are aﬀected by market prices. In general, there may be a vector of
selling prices and a vector of buying prices. Clearly, only the highest selling price and the
lowest buying price are relevant to agents’ decisions. We let QSt denote the price at which
projects are sold to market makers, namely, the highest selling price, and QBt the price at
which projects are bought from market makers, namely, the lowest buying price.
Let Bt denote the number of agents who buy and St the number who sell in period t.
These agents include both the idiosyncratic traders and the investors. The publicly observable
events are zt =( Bt,S t,Q Bt,Q St). The public history is ht =( z0,z 1,...,z t−1).H e r e ,a sb e f o r e ,
hit denotes the history of investor i in period t. This history records the signal the investors
have received, if any, and the period in which they received it, in addition to the public history.
The model’s active agents include idiosyncratic traders as well as the newly informed, the
previously informed, and the uninformed investors. Strategies do not need to be deﬁned for
either idiosyncratic traders or inactive investors.
An investor’s strategy and beliefs are sequences of functions xt(hit) and pt(hit) that
map the investor’s histories into actions {S,B,I,N} and into the probability that the state
is high. The payoﬀ to an investor who buys in period t with history hit and current prices
QBt and QSt is
VBt(hit)=[ pt(hit)A − 1] + [pt(hit)A − 1 − QBt]
while the payoﬀ to an investor who sells is QSt and the payoﬀ to an investor who chooses I




µt(hit+1|hit)max{VBt+1(hit+1),Q St+1(ht+1),V It+1(hit+1),W t+1(hit+1)}/(1 + r)
where µt(hit+1|hit) is the conditional distribution over history in t +1given the history in
t. The future histories and the conditional distributions are induced from the strategies and
the structure of exogenous uncertainty of the game in the obvious way.
Consider now the market makers. They do not receive signals. In each period t, each
market maker posts prices at which an agent can buy or sell one risky project. The market
maker understands that investors’ signals determine whether investors want to buy or sell.
Thus, when an agent wants to buy a risky project, the market maker has a diﬀerent posterior
than when an agent wants to sell. Hence, the market maker charges diﬀerent prices for buying
and selling. In equilibrium, competition among market makers ensures that the buying and
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Bt)A − 1,0} (14)
where pB(ht,Q 0
Bt) is the posterior of this market maker. This posterior depends on the market
maker’s posted price because the mix of agents attracted to the market maker depends on
the posted price. (Of course, the mix also depends on prices posted by other market makers,
QBt(ht) and QSt(ht), but these prices are known functions of the history ht and, hence, are
suppressed.) If an agent sells a project, then the market maker receives a payoﬀ of
max{pS(ht,Q
0




St) is the posterior of the market maker given Q0
St.
O n ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h e s ep a y o ﬀsi st h a te a c hm a r k e tm a k e ri se n d o w e dw i t hap r oj e c t
which the market maker can run, and each market maker can buy a second project and run it
too. The opportunity cost of selling the project to an agent is max{pS(ht,Q 0
Bt)A−1,0}. Thus,
if an agent buys a project, the proﬁts of the market maker are given by (14). Clearly, if an
agent sells a project, the proﬁts of the market maker are given by (15). Another interpretation
18of the payoﬀsi st h a tm a r k e tm a k e r sa r ei n t e r m e d i a r i e sb e t w e e nt h ea g e n t si nt h i sm a r k e ta n d
uninformed agents outside of it.
2.2. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is a collection of strategies xt(hit,Q Bt,Q St), prices QBt(ht)
and QSt(ht), and beliefs pt(ht),p B(ht,Q Bt),p S(ht,Q St), and pt(hit) such that (i)t h es t r a t e g i e s
xt(·) are optimal for the investors, (ii)t h ep r i c e ss e tb ym a r k e tm a k e r sm a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts given
in (14) and (15), (iii) a market maker’s proﬁts evaluated at QBt(ht) and QSt(ht) are equal
to zero, and (iv) where possible, the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule.
Consider ﬁrst the beliefs and strategies of the market makers. Competition among
market makers drives their expected proﬁts to zero on both purchases and sales. In equilib-
rium, the market maker loses by trading with informed investors and gains by trading with
idiosyncratic investors. Before trading, the market makers’ beliefs are the public beliefs. The
information revealed in trading leads market makers to value individual projects between the
value implied by public beliefs and the value assigned by the investor given the investor’s
private information.
In terms of characterizing the equilibrium, it is easier to write the strategies as func-
tions of the public beliefs p = pt(ht) rather than the histories ht directly. The equilibrium
prices charged by market makers fall into one of two regions; which one depends on the level of
public beliefs p. First, consider a discriminating region in which the newly informed investor
buys when the signal is high and sells when the signal is low. This is the only interesting
discriminating action by the informed investor because selling when the signal is high and
buying when the signal is low cannot be part of an equilibrium. We claim that in such a
region the equilibrium prices are
QBt(p)=m a x {PU(p)A − 1,0} (16)




(1 − α)/2+α[pq +( 1− p)(1 − q)]
(18)
19PD(p)=
p[(1 − α)/2+α(1 − q)]
(1 − α)/2+α[p(1 − q)+( 1− p)q]
. (19)
In this region, PU(p) turns out to be the posterior beliefs of the market maker conditional
on receiving a buy order, and PD(p) turns out to be the posterior beliefs conditional on
receiving a sell order. (The subscripts U and D indicate that the beliefs move up and down,
respectively.)
We show that in the discriminating region, proﬁts are zero at the equilibrium prices,
and no market maker can gain by deviating. To evaluate the expected proﬁts of the market
maker, we need to form the posteriors of the market maker. Consider a buy decision by an
agent. Using Bayes’ rule, we see that the posterior of the market maker is PU(p), given in
(18). The probability that the agent is an idiosyncratic trader is (1 − α)/2. The probability
that the agent is an investor and receives a high signal is αq. The prior probability that the
state is H is p. Thus, the probability that the state is high and an agent buys from the market
maker is given by the numerator of (18). The denominator of (18) is simply the probability
that an agent buys from the market maker. Similar reasoning establishes that the posterior
of the market maker to whom agents sell is given by PD(p), or (19). Given these posteriors,
it follows from (14) and (15) that the expected proﬁts of the market maker are zero at the
prices given by (16) and (17).
In this region, no market maker can gain by deviating. The interesting deviations are
those that lower the price at which investors can buy and raise the price at which investors
can sell. Clearly, in either case, expected proﬁts are negative.
Consider next the region of beliefs in which the newly informed investor takes a nondis-
criminating action, that is, the same action regardless of the signal. We claim that in such
a region, the equilibrium prices are QBt(p)=m a x {pA − 1,0} and QSt(p)=m a x {pA − 1,0}.
Clearly, now a buy or sell decision does not convey any information to the market maker, and
the market maker’s posterior stays at the public belief p. Substituting these posteriors and
the equilibrium prices into (14) and (15) gives that the expected proﬁts of the market maker
are zero at these prices. Clearly, any deviation by a market maker leads to negative proﬁts.
In equilibrium, public beliefs in period t +1a r et h es a m ea st h em a r k e tm a k e r ’ s
20posteriors after trading in period t. These public beliefs will always be equal to p(k) for some
integer k, where p(0) = p0,p (1) = PD(p0),p (−1) = PU(p0), and so on. This follows since PU
and PD are symmetric, in the sense that PU(PD(p)) = PD(PU(p)) = p.
To characterize the equilibrium strategies of investors, we assume the analogs of (9),
(10), and (11), that
p(0)A>1 (20)
p(−1)A<1 (21)
p(0)A − 1 <v B(p(0))[p(1)A − 1]/(1 + r) (22)
where vB(p)=[ ( 1− α)/2]+ α[pq +( 1− p)(1 − q)] is the probability that investors will see a
buy when the public beliefs are p.
Under these assumptions, if the fraction of idiosyncratic traders, 1 − α, is suﬃciently
small, then the equilibrium outcome path is very similar to that in the continuous investment
model. For such a fraction, the strategy for newly informed investors is to take a discriminat-
ing action if public beliefs are at p(−1) or higher and to wait otherwise. The discriminating
action is to buy if their signal is high and sell if their signal is low. The strategy of the
uninformed and previously informed investors is to invest in the risky project if their beliefs
are at least p(1) and to wait if their beliefs are at or below p(0). These investors never trade.
From these strategies, it is easy to construct how beliefs evolve.
These strategies lead to the following equilibrium outcomes. Whenever the newly
informed agent is an idiosyncratic trader, the equilibrium outcome is obvious. We focus on
outcomes in which the newly informed agent is an investor. The newly informed investor in
period 0 takes a discriminating action, and all uninformed investors wait.
If the agent in period 0 buys, then the public beliefs in period 1 rise to p(1), and
all uninformed investors invest, setting oﬀ a cascade of investment. If the agent in period 0
sells, these public beliefs fall to p(−1), and uninformed investors wait. The newly informed
investor in period 1 buys if the signal is high and sells if the signal is low.
21If the agents in both periods 0 and 1 sell, then public beliefs fall to p(−2),a n dn o
investor invests in period 2 or any subsequent period. This history starts a cascade of no
investment. If there has been no investment in period 0, but an investment in period 1, then
both the uninformed investors and the previously informed investor have a prior of p(0), they
wait, and the newly informed investor invests if and only if the signal is high.
Consider now the equilibrium outcomes for arbitrary α. For any given α, let k be
deﬁned as the smallest integer that satisﬁes
PL(p(k))A<1 <P H(p(k))A.
The newly informed investors’ strategies are to take a discriminating action if public beliefs
are at p(k) or greater and to not trade otherwise. Note that under (20) and (21) when α =
0, k = −1.T h u s ,f o rα suﬃciently small, k = −1 as well.
2.3. Herds
As before, we now deﬁne a herd relative to a public signal game. The public signal
game which captures some of the information constraints of the private signal game is the
following. In each period t, with probability α, as i g n a lH or L is drawn from the distribution
in (3); this signal is received by the agent at the beginning of the period and becomes public
at the end of the period. With probability (1−α)/2, an idiosyncratic trader buys, and at the
end of the period, the public sees the signal H. With probability (1 − α)/2, an idiosyncratic
trader sells, and at the end of the period, the public sees the signal L. The outcomes of the
public signal game again correspond to the eﬃcient outcomes of a suitably deﬁned mechanism
design problem.
The following assumption, the analog of (13), implies that the equilibrium cascades
are ineﬃcient:
p(1)A − 1 <
n
vB(p(1))[p(2)A − 1] + vS(p(1))vB(p(0))[p(1)A − 1]
o
/(1 + r) (23)
where vS(p)=[ ( 1− α)/2] + α[p(1 − q)+( 1− p)q] is the probability that investors will see a
sell when the public beliefs are p. In the appendix, we prove the following proposition:
22Proposition 4. (Herds with Prices) Under (20)—(23), the model has herds of both
investment and no investment.
In the model, we have investors making investment decisions as well as trading deci-
sions. To better understand the role the investment decisions play, consider a version of the
model with no investment decisions. In this version, imagine that all investment projects have
been undertaken before the model starts. In the exogenous timing version of this model, in
each period of the active phase, the private signal of the informed investor is revealed through
market trades, and herd behavior cannot occur. (This version of the model and the results
are very similar to those of Avery and Zemsky [2] and Glosten and Milgrom [11].)
The endogenous timing version of the model without investment decisions also has no
herds. Here the only possibilities are to buy, to sell, and to wait. Clearly, the only way to get
a herd in this version of the model is to have all the uninformed investors buy or sell at some
public prior. Suppose that in some period there is a herd in which all uninformed investors
buy. In this period, with positive probability, one of the buyers is informed. The market
maker sets the buy price so as to make zero proﬁts across the diﬀerent types of buyers. At
this price, the market maker loses by trading with informed investors and therefore must gain
by trading with uninformed investors. Since uninformed investors would lose if they traded
with the market maker, they would optimally choose not to trade. Therefore, there cannot
be such a herd. A similar argument applies to herds of sales.
Our notion of a herd is quite diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fA v e r ya n dZ e m s k y[ 2 ] .W ef o l l o w
the rest of the literature in assuming that a herd must be a cascade. In a cascade with
investment, the uninformed investors choose not to wait for their private signals and invest
in the market. In a cascade without investment, the uninformed investors choose not to wait
for their private signals and invest outside of the market. In either case, the notion of cascade
captures the idea that the uninformed investors are in some sense “following the crowd.” In
our deﬁnition of a herd, w ea d dt ot h i sn o t i o no fc a s c a d et h a tt h ec r o w di st a k i n gas o c i a l l y
ineﬃcient action relative to some benchmark. Avery and Zemsky [2] modify the model of
Glosten and Milgrom [11] in an attempt to revive herds. In their Proposition 2, however,
23they show that their model cannot generate cascades. Thus, if they had used any version of
the standard deﬁnition of herds in the literature, their Proposition 2 also would prove that
there are no herds in their model. Indeed, in their model, the public beliefs converge to a
degenerate distribution on the true state, so there is no sense in which information becomes
trapped forever.
Avery and Zemsky [2] pursue a diﬀerent tack. They propose a deﬁnition of a herd quite
diﬀerent from that in the literature and then show that their model can produce this kind
of behavior. Brieﬂy, Avery and Zemsky say that an informed investor who buys in period t
engages in herd behavior if three conditions are met. First, this investor’s private information
about the state is negative. Second, along the equilibrium path, the pattern of trading leads
to an increase in the market maker’s prior about the mean value of the asset. Third, after
such a path of trading, the investor buys. Avery and Zemsky show that this seemingly odd
behavior can occur when, in addition to private signals, all investors have a common piece of
information that market markers do not have. In this setup, the market makers infer a noisier
version of the underlying signal from the equilibrium trades than investors infer. This noisier
inference leads market makers to update their beliefs more slowly than investors. Hence,
even though an investor’s private signal is negative, a string of buys can lead this investor to
become more optimistic about the value of an asset than the market maker and hence lead
the investor to buy.
Our view is that while the behavior generated by Avery and Zemsky’s [2] model is
both interesting and perverse, their notion of herds is quite diﬀerent from that in the rest of
the literature. In relation to our deﬁnition, it might be more precise to label the behavior
they uncover “waves of optimism and pessimism” rather than herds.
3. Conclusion
We have here taken a step toward developing models of herd behavior that can be
used in applied work. We have demonstrated that recent critiques of early herd models can
be overturned when the exogenous timing of investment decisions in the models is replaced
24by a more natural endogenous timing. We think, therefore, that models of herd behavior
have the potential to help us understand ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets and elsewhere.
Here we have considered a variant of the early herd models with homogenous individ-
uals and a simple structure for signals. Smith and Sorensen [17] extend the herd literature to
heterogeneous individuals and a more general structure for signals to allow for situations in
which, in equilibrium, agents’ actions settle down to some limit distribution over a nontrivial
set of actions, but learning is never complete. To capture this situation, the notion of a
herd must be appropriately modiﬁed. With that modiﬁcation, our results might fruitfully be
extended to some of the more general setups considered by Smith and Sorensen.
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Deﬁnitions and Proofs
Deﬁning Strategies and Beliefs
Here we formally deﬁne strategies and beliefs for our continuous investment model.
At p = pt(hit), the strategy for all uninformed and previously informed investors is
xt(hit)={x(p) if p ≥ p(1)} (24)
and xt(hit)=0otherwise, while the strategy for newly informed investors is
xt(hit)={x(p) if p ≥ p(0)} (25)
and 0 otherwise. Notice that in order to invest, the uninformed and previously informed
investors must be more optimistic than the newly informed investors. We refer to p(1) and
p(0) as the cutoﬀ levels–p(1) for the uninformed and previously informed investors and p(0)
for the informed investors.
The beliefs of uninformed investors clearly coincide with the public beliefs. We say
that public beliefs are in the discriminating region if they are equal to either p(−1) or p(0)
and are in the nondiscriminating region otherwise. Given pt−1(ht−1) and a total investment of
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where p0(h0)=p(0). In the nondiscriminating region,p t(ht)=pt−1(ht−1).
The beliefs of the newly informed investors at history hit =( ht,s,t) are simply the
public beliefs, updated by the newly informed investor’s signal: pt(ht,s,t)=Ps(pt(ht)) for
s = H,L.
T h eb e l i e f so ft h ep r e v i o u s l yi n f o r m e di n v e s t o ri nt who received a signal in t−1 with
history hit =( ht,s,t− 1) are deﬁned as follows. If no other investor invested in t − 1, this
investor’s beliefs are the same in t as they were in t − 1: pt(ht,s,t)=Ps(pt−1(ht−1)) for s =
H,L. If some other investor invested in t−1, then pt(ht,s,t)=p(2). The beliefs of previously
informed investors who received their signals before period t−1 are recursively deﬁned using
(26) except that the recursion starts in period v, with the beliefs of the newly informed
investor in v: pv(hiv,s,v). These strategies and beliefs induce the conditional distributions
µt(hit+1|hit) in the obvious way.
Built into these beliefs is the idea that investors look at previous investors’ actions and
try to infer their signals. On the equilibrium path and for deviations that they cannot detect,
26investors infer the following. Consider the uninformed investors with public beliefs p in the
discriminating region. If these investors see Xt = x(PH(p)), then they infer that the newly
informed investor received a high signal. If they see Xt = x(PL(p))=0 , then they infer that
the newly informed investor received a low signal. If public beliefs are equal to p(−2), then
uninformed investors expect to see no investment regardless of the newly informed investor’s
signal. Both the newly informed and the previously informed investors simply update the
public beliefs with their private signal. We have also ﬁlled in beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path
in an intuitive way. Our results are unaﬀected by these choices.
Proving Propositions
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (9)—(10) and (11)—(12), the strategies and beliefs
described above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1. By construction, the beliefs in (26) satisfy Bayes’ rule. We
repeatedly use the observation that by construction, for any history hit,p t(hit)=p(k) for
some integer k.
Consider ﬁrst optimality for histories with no detectable deviations. Start with the
strategies of the uninformed investors. With public beliefs p(0), (11) ensures that waiting
is optimal, while with beliefs p(−1) and below, (10) ensures this. With public beliefs p(1)
and above, all uninformed investors are supposed to invest. Suppose that an uninformed
investor instead deviates and waits. Recall that for such a history, all other active investors
have already invested. Thus, by waiting, the uninformed investor receives no new information
from others. The only reason to wait, therefore, is that the investor might receive a signal. An
upper bound on the payoﬀs from waiting is given by the case in which the investor is certain
to receive a signal in the following period. Assumption (12) ensures that this deviation is not
proﬁtable.
Now turn to the strategies of the informed investors at some history hit.T h ei n t e r e s t i n g
histories are those in which public beliefs are p(0) or p(−1) and the newly informed investor
has just received a high signal. Suppose, ﬁrst, that the public beliefs are at p(−1).Ad e v i a t i o n
by the informed investor causes public beliefs to drop to p(−2) and triggers a cascade with
no investment. This deviation brings the investor no new information, so by discounting, it
is better to invest immediately.
Suppose next that the public beliefs are at p(0), and the newly informed investor re-
ceives a high signal, so now has beliefs p(1). The strategy for the newly informed investor
speciﬁes invest, but suppose this investor instead deviates and waits, presumably to garner
information about the signals of subsequent informed investors. Note ﬁrst that, in all subse-
quent periods, the beliefs of this deviating investor are 2 higher than those of the uninformed
27investors, in the sense that if public beliefs are at p(k), the deviating investor’s beliefs are at
p(k +2). The reason is that the newly informed investor’s private signal raised the investors’
beliefs by 1 and the deviation by the newly informed investor lowered the uninformed in-
vestors’ beliefs by 1 without aﬀecting the investor’s own beliefs.
Next note that a herd of investment starts when uninformed investors’ beliefs are at
p(1), and a herd of no investment starts when they are at p(−2). Hence, in any period after
the deviation, the deviating investor’s beliefs can never be below p(0) or above p(3). Moreover,
if this investor’s beliefs reach p(0), they stay there because the uninformed investors’ beliefs
are at p(−2), and there is a cascade without investment. Consequently, it is optimal for the
deviating investor to invest immediately at beliefs p(0).I ft h i si n v e s t o r ’ sb e l i e f sr e a c hp(3),
they stay there because the uninformed investors’ beliefs are at p(1), and there is a cascade
with investment. Consequently, it is optimal for the deviating investor to invest immediately
at beliefs p(3).
Since it is optimal for the deviating investor to invest at p(0) and p(3), ar e c u r s i v e
application of (12) implies that the original deviation is not proﬁtable. To see this formally,
suppose that the optimal continuation strategy for the deviating investor is to invest at p(2).
Then (12) implies that the original deviation cannot be proﬁtable. The reason is that then
the right side of (12) is the payoﬀ to the deviation of waiting and the left side is the payoﬀ
to investing immediately, where both sides are evaluated at p = p(1). Similar reasoning
establishes that if the optimal continuation strategy for the deviating investor is to invest
at p(1), then the original deviation cannot be proﬁtable. The only possibility that remains
is that the optimal continuation strategy for the deviating investor is to wait at both p(1)
and p(2). We will rule out this possibility by contradiction. Suppose that the deviating
investor waits at p(1) and p(2). Let W(p(1)) and W(p(2)) denote the payoﬀs at these beliefs,
respectively. These payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y
W(p(1)) = [r + vH(p(1))W(p(2)) + vL(p(1))V(p(0))]/(1 + r) (27)
W(p(2)) = [r + vH(p(2))V(p(3)) + vL(p(2))W(p(1))]/(1 + r). (28)
Using (12), we can see that Eqs. (27) and (28) imply that
W(p(1)) <V(p(1)) + vH(p(1))[W(p(2)) − V(p(2))]/(1 + r) (29)
W(p(2)) <V(p(2)) + vL(p(2))[W(p(1)) − V(p(1))]/(1 + r). (30)
Substituting (30) into (29) gives an immediate contradiction. Thus, the optimal continuation
strategy for a deviating investor must be to invest at either p(1) or p(2). It follows that the
original deviation cannot be proﬁtable.
28For histories in which the newly informed investor’s beliefs are at or below p(−1),( 1 0 )
implies that deviating to investing is not optimal.
Finally, it is easy to show that for histories oﬀ the equilibrium path, the strategies for
all investors are optimal. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. (Herds with Prices) Under (20)—(23), the model has herds of both
investment and no investment.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4. The proof that these strategies of the investors are optimal
and that the beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 1.
The proof that the prices are optimal is in the text. The proof that there are herds of no
investment is immediate.
To see that there are herds of investment, consider a period t in either the private or the
public signal game in which public beliefs are at p(1). In the private signal game, all investors
invest. In the public signal game, (23) implies that the uninformed investors wait. Waiting
dominates investing. To see that, consider the following (possibly suboptimal) strategy: Wait
in t. If the end-of-period t public signal is H, invest in t +1 . If the end-of-period t public
signal is L, wait in t+1. If the end-of-period t+1signal is H, invest in t+2;otherwise, never
invest. The payoﬀ to this strategy is the right side of (23), which by assumption is larger
than the payoﬀ to investing in t, p(1)A − 1. Q.E.D.
29Notes
1One interpretation of this environment is that the risky project consists of investments
in an emerging economy while the safe project consists of investments in the United States.
Returns from the risky project depend on whether the emerging market’s government expro-
priates the investments. Herds in this context consist of sudden reversals of capital ﬂows. For
a model of herd behavior and expropriation with this interpretation, see Chari and Kehoe
[8].
2We can imagine that agents are randomly drawn without replacement from the pool
of agents and assigned a number designating the period in which each will receive a signal.
Neither the names of the agents who will receive the signals nor the periods in which these
agents will receive signals are observed, but the process for assigning names and periods is
common knowledge.
Also note that conceptually, it is easy to instead allow signals to arrive intermittently,
say, according to a Poisson process. The results are similar; however, the resulting algebra is
more complicated.
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